

SOCIAL COHESION

CHAPTER

METHODOLOGY

The sector chapters were predominantly designed to present the data that exists, and that was shared with the Multi Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) team. Annex A provides a summary of the assessments and reports reviewed for the chapter. There is much that sector experts know from experience that is not captured in the assessment reports. To capture some of the expert views within the Sector Working Groups (SWGs), MSNA SWG workshops were facilitated by the MSNA team and sector experts. These views are taken into account throughout the document. However, due to the short notice, attendance was limited in some workshops and the views presented in the chapter cannot be considered as representative of all SWG members.

The MSNA team aimed to provide an objective overview of the available data and SWG views and therefore has not altered the data or language used in the reports and assessments.

The following target groups were used for the purposes of data analysis:

- Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR or awaiting registration
- Syrians living in Lebanon who have not been registered with UNHCR
- Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS)
- Vulnerable local Communities including Host Communities and Palestinians (PRL)
- Lebanese returnees

Analysis was undertaken at the lowest possible geographic levels for the various target groups, depending on the type of information available. Where possible, information was aggregated to; Mount Lebanon and Beirut, South, Bekaa, Akkar, North/T+5, Palestinian Camps, and Outside Palestinian Camps.

Main Steps



- **Identifying information needs:** In order to identify the relevant research questions for collation, the Thematic Working Group (TWG) combined the indicators of the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP6) with additional information needs from the SWG. These information needs were used to form the basis of the chapter themes.
- **Secondary data collation:** An assessment inventory was developed and shared for input from as many stakeholders as possible; to encourage sharing of assessment data. A sector focal point was assigned from the TWG and supported the MSNA team to collect data from the sectors. Within the team, analysts were assigned to sector chapters and a number of partners were approached including: INGOs, UN agencies, the Ministry of Social Affairs Lebanon (MoSA), the National NGO forum and the World Bank with requests for assessment reports.
- **Data categorisation:** To facilitate the data analysis component, all data was summarised and categorised into an excel spreadsheet.
- **Analysis and Writing:** The Sector Leads and respective analysts assessed the usefulness of the reports and used them accordingly. For example, a nationwide multi-sector report would have been used to develop broad conclusions, whilst an assessment with a small sample size in one particular location may have been used to provide examples to support/contradict the overall findings.
- **Review and Consultation:** The MSNA team reviewed a number of databases, assessments and reports that were provided by partner agencies. In order to obtain as comprehensive overview as possible a number of consultations were built in with the SWGs.

For more information on the methodology please refer to the main report.

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SECTION 1

1. KEY FINDINGS

Summary of Priorities

Based on the data review and inputs from the Sector Working Group we can provide the following preliminary conclusions:

The perceptions as expressed by members of the sector working groups were in line with the findings of the assessments reviewed. The findings from the data and the MSNA SWG workshops both indicate that the priority needs include mitigation measures to combat the increasing sources of tension, including increasing the social interactions between and among communities. In addition, a number of measures are required to mitigate against violence and harassment, including an early warning system.

We can conclude that the needs of all target groups are similar and that social cohesion interventions are required throughout the country, but most urgently in the North and Bekaa. Priorities will differ in different geographic locations. Data around response does not highlight gaps, but a part of the SWGs have discerned that the entire response needs to integrate social cohesion as a cross cutting issue, capacity-building of local actors is required, and there is a need to reinforce skills and knowledge on the concept of “do no harm”.

In terms of the future, the participants in the MSNA SWG workshop identified the following factors that could impact the sector: increased tension due to water shortages, consequences of the upcoming elections, a change in the situation in Syria, an increase in security incidents that could lead to a mobilisation along sectarian lines throughout the country, and large scale cash programming that could further reinforce negative perceptions around Syrians receiving disproportionate amounts of aid.

1.1 Priority Needs

Based on the data available, the MSNA team has found the following priority needs¹:

- Mitigation of the impact of the crisis on Lebanese stability, including in electricity, transport, infrastructure, water supply and wastewater and health.
- Alleviation of pressure on immediate sources of tensions, particularly economic pressure and access to livelihoods.
- Access to adequate information on the humanitarian response and the role of government institutions to counterbalance misperceptions.
- Increased opportunities for social interaction between and among communities.
- Protection of vulnerable communities against harassment and violence.
- Increased capacity of local conflict mitigation and response mechanisms.
- “Conflict sensitise” humanitarian sectors to acknowledge that their actions may have effects on community cohesion.

The participants of the MSNA SWG workshop identified the following needs:

- Security from physical violence for all target groups is one of the main needs. More specifically, the following needs were identified during the workshop:
 - Building social cohesion through addressing basic needs and services. Livelihoods support is of particular importance, as economic vulnerability is a main determinant in propensity towards violence.
 - Establishment of an early warning system in combination with an early response system to enable rapid identification and response to security incidents and tensions.
 - Reinforcement of the capacity of local institutions and law enforcement agencies to identify and respond to tensions and incidents.
 - Mainstreaming social cohesion throughout the current response through awareness raising and capacity building, followed by sector-specific practical measures to address existing issues.
 - Identification and recognition of vulnerabilities among groups other than Syrian refugees to counterbalance the perception that Syrian refugees receive a disproportionate amount of support. In that regard, there is a need to improve awareness and communication around the response provided and positive impact of the Syria crisis.

1.2 Priority Target Groups

Based on the data available it was not possible to identify priority target groups.

The participants of the MSNA SWG workshop highlighted that while exact needs differ among the target groups, overall priority needs are similar as social cohesion is a cross-cutting issue.

1.3 Geographic Priorities

Based on the data available, the MSNA team has found the following geographic priorities:

- Tripoli (Jabal Mohsen, Bab al-Tabbaneh and Qibbe)
- Saida (Haret Saida, Taamir, TaamirEinElHilweh, Abra)
- Beirut (Cola, Kaskas, Tariq al Jadideh), the northern Akkar region (especially WadiKhaled)

¹ It should be noted that the MSNA team’s analysis has been built from the data that was available and might not capture the complete situation on the ground.

- Bekaa (especially Aarsal, Hermel).

The participants of the MSNA SWG workshop indicated that the areas which are particularly vulnerable, due to a high concentration of refugees in combination with high levels of poverty, are used as a starting point for organisations to identify priority areas. However, the situation differs within and among geographical areas, where in Mount Lebanon for instance, tensions are partly caused by the lack of historical relationships between Syrian and Lebanese communities, in Wadi Khaled tensions are fuelled by socio-economic reasons. Participants indicated that the level of urgency is higher in North and Bekaa. In addition, it was highlighted that curfews can be an indication of a deterioration of social cohesion in a specific area.

1.4 Response Gap Analysis

The available data does not provide an indication on response gaps.

During the MSNA SWG workshop, the discussion on response gaps highlighted the following gaps:

- A lack of integration of social cohesion in the ongoing response
- Capacity building in mitigation of disputes among local actors
- A need to reinforce skills and knowledge on the concept of “do no harm”

1.5 Future Developments with Possible Impact on the Sector

Based on the data available, the MSNA team has found the following possible future developments may have an impact on the sector:

- Further spill-over of the Syrian conflict
- Delays in formation of a government in Lebanon
- Social unrest as a result of economic deprivation
- Attribution of crime and disease to a specific group
- Opportunities to mobilise pre-existing grievances (e.g. sectarian tensions)
- Indiscriminate attacks by extremist Islamist groups
- The fall of the Government of Syria
- High-level assassination in Lebanon
- Regional conflict

The participants of the MSNA SWG workshop identified the following possible future developments which may have an impact on the sector:

- Water shortages increasing tensions
- Upcoming elections and consequences
- Change in situation in Syria
- Security incident, for instance in Aarsal, leading to mobilisation across the country
- Large-scale cash assistance programmes reinforcing the negative perceptions related to Syrians receiving disproportional amounts of aid.

2. CONTEXT

In a UN Security Council Presidential statement in July 2013, the Security Council underlines the need for assistance on an unprecedented scale, both to meet the needs of the refugees and of host communities, and to assist the Lebanese authorities who face extraordinary financial and structural challenges as a result of the refugee influx. Lebanon is hosting a number of registered Syrian refugees and recorded Palestinian refugees equal to 25% of the total estimated Lebanese population.

The potential for tensions between the communities is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of refugees (an estimated 85%) are living in 229 communities where the majority of economically vulnerable Lebanese (66%) also reside.

As the country grapples with its own political and internal divisions, the immense and growing strain on host communities is contributing to tensions between host communities and refugees, as evidenced by an increase in the number of violent incidents against refugees. Moreover, multiple dynamics are at play, involving Lebanese-Lebanese, Lebanese-Syrian, Lebanese-Palestinian, and Syrian-Palestinian tensions. Several underlying and pre-existing conflicts have ignited as a result of the crisis in Syria. For instance, sectarian tensions between the Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhoods of Tripoli dating back to Lebanon's civil war have intensified due to spill-over from Syria.

Figure [1]: Most vulnerable populations by geographic area



SECTION 3

3. DATA SOURCES

At the start of the process, SWGs developed a list of information needs (i.e. those themes that they required information on within their sector). These were built from RRP6 indicators and a consultation within the working group. For the purpose of Phase 1, MSNA analysts reviewed and examined the available data on each theme. See Section 4 for results.

The table below highlights the information needs and whether or not they were met by the available data.

Table [1]: Extent to which information needs have been met through data available to the MSNA team

Information Need
Impact of the crisis on the stability in Lebanon
Structural and proximate sources of tensions
Current conflict trends
Capacity of municipalities, and other relevant actors to respond to population groups with specific needs
Possible triggers for further escalation
Conflict prone areas
Resources to mitigate/manage conflict and potential change agents

Legend:

	the information need has been met
	there is some data, but not enough to fully address the information need
	no data available to the MSNA team at the time of writing

This section aims to highlight the data sources and limitations.

General:

- 14 assessments and studies published in 2013 or 2014 are available on social cohesion in Lebanon, including four multi-sector assessments covering the topic.
- Where possible, we attempted to separate data regarding registered, awaiting registration, and unregistered Syrian refugees. However, because most data was collected at the household level, even surveys targeting Syria refugees registered and awaiting registration include unregistered refugees and therefore cannot be separated. Even though the data is presented for overall Syrian refugees regardless of registration status, we should assume there are differences between these groups.
- As with other sectors, much of the data gathered on social cohesion relies on the perceptions of respondents and key informants. The nature of this type of assessment means that prejudicial factors

risk being a significant determinant. More hard data on the actual impact of the refugees' presence on opportunities, livelihoods and services, disaggregated into geographic areas, is not yet available. When host communities cite, for example, a rise in insecurity, it is unclear whether there are in fact an increasing number of incidents or whether there is a rise in fear and suspicion. Existing data on violent incidents suffer limitations and have only started being collected recently.

- Assessments often cite tensions and conflict between communities but these concepts are not further qualified. It is unclear whether conflict, for example, describes resentment, verbal disagreements or actual physical violence. This ambiguity makes accurately monitoring the situation and any developments problematic.

SECTION 4

The following section provides an analysis of data according to theme, including a summary table of assessment coverage by target group and geographic region.

4. ANALYSIS PER THEME

4.1 Impact of the Crisis on Stability in Lebanon

Summary of assessment findings: Almost all assessments on the topic highlight the significant impact of the Syrian crisis on available resources and services, with the crisis for instance resulting in a lower GDP and increasing unemployment. The main sectors requiring stabilisation according to the Government of Lebanon (GoL) are electricity, transport infrastructure, water supply and wastewater and health. Only limited information is available on the possible positive impacts or beneficial effects of the crisis and the refugee situation. However, the available information indicates that the positive effects primarily benefit the middle- and high-income segment of the population, while the poorest are most affected via the impact on public service delivery and livelihoods.

The following table shows which target groups and geographic regions are covered by the assessments used in this section. It does not, however, show the quality of the assessments or the extent of the coverage.


Table [2]: Assessment coverage by geographic area and target population

	Vulnerable Local Communities (Lebanese and PRL)	Lebanese Returnees	PRS	Syrian refugees	
				Registered	Unregistered
National					
North/T+5					
Akkar					
Mt. Lebanon and Beirut					
Bekaa					
South					
Palestinian Camps					
Outside Palestinian Camps					
<i>*NB – Grey cells indicate that there is at least one assessment available on the specific area or target group. However, the data may not cover the situation for the entire geographic area or target group.</i>					

The following information covers all groups residing in Lebanon

The most comprehensive study available on the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon, the September 2013 UN-World Bank Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, highlights the following impact on existing resources for the 2012-2014 period:

- The report finds that the conflict may cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year, entailing large losses in terms of wages, profits, taxes, or private consumption and investment;
- Push approximately 170,000 Lebanese into poverty (over and above the 1 million currently living below the poverty line) and double the unemployment rate to above 20%, most of them unskilled youth, and;
- Depress Government of Lebanon (GoL) revenue collection by USD1.5 billion while simultaneously increasing government expenditure by USD1.1 billion due to the surge in demand for public services, bringing the total fiscal impact to USD2.6 billion.
- Across all key public services, the surge in demand is currently being partly met through a decline in both the access to and the quality of public service delivery. It is estimated that additional spending of USD2.5 billion would be required for stabilisation, i.e., to reinstate the access to and quality of public services to their pre-Syrian conflict level.



Within the Stabilisation Road Map of October 2013, the GoL quantifies the impact of the Syria crisis on specific sectors and identifies three strategic objectives to ensure stability in Lebanon, namely: restore and expand economic and livelihood opportunities, and create an enabling environment for private sector investment; restore and build resilience in access to and quality of sustainable basic public services, and; strengthen social cohesion.

Some positive effects of the crisis have also been reported. Revenues for the Port of Beirut increased by 26% in 2013, as regional traders increasingly rely on Lebanese merchants and infrastructure. Lebanese exports have replaced some Syrian exports: industrial exports increased by 13.5% between June 2012 and 2013.

A World Vision assessment in July 2013 showed that some members of host communities are clearly benefiting economically from the refugee influx, primarily among middle class and wealthy Lebanese. Interviewees noted that the arrival of aid agencies was injecting new money into the local economy and creating job opportunities. Local businesses are benefitting from the availability of cheap labour, whilst landlords and landowners are making significant profits on renting out land or living space.

4.2 Structural and Proximate Sources of Tensions

Summary of assessment findings: All assessments highlight significant pre-existing structural causes of tensions, but these have been aggravated by the Syria crisis. These include the underlying tensions between communities of differing religious and political loyalties, weak public institutions and public services and limited national cohesion. In addition, assessments mention tensions related to land ownership, the use of water sources, public services and disputes within local governance bodies as sources of tensions pre-existing to the crisis.

Immediate sources of tension identified within different reports include economic pressure and access to livelihoods, inter-group resentment and limited social interactions between host communities and refugees. The propensity to violence seems to increase in response to economic privation, lack of coping strategy, and limited capacity of local government. Negative perceptions are also a key factor in tensions. Indeed, fears, feelings of insecurity and resentment seem to stem more from prejudices, word of mouth and media than personal experiences or strong cultural incompatibilities between Lebanese and Syrians. Syrians who closely follow events back home are also more likely to justify violence. There is a widespread perception among Lebanese communities that Syrians are benefitting disproportionately from the national and international response.

Local assessments remain necessary to understand how these different factors play out at the local level. Existing local assessments show that sources of tensions vary across and within governorates, districts and villages.

The available information on Palestinian refugees shows that overcrowding is a source of tensions within Palestinian camps, as is competition over employment.

Moreover, most assessments focus on Lebanese-Syrian tensions, and there is less information on the impact of the crisis on pre-existing Lebanese-Lebanese or Lebanese-Palestinian refugee tensions.

The following table shows which target groups and geographic regions are covered by the assessments used in this section. It does not, however, show the quality of the assessments or the extent of the coverage.

Table [3]: Assessment coverage by geographic area and target population

	Vulnerable Local Communities (Lebanese and PRL)	Lebanese Returnees	PRS	Syrian refugees	
				Registered	Unregistered
National					
North/T+5					
Akkar					
Mt. Lebanon and Beirut					
Bekaa					
South					
Palestinian Camps					
Outside Palestinian Camps					
Legend					
	Section not applicable			Data available	
*NB – Grey cells indicate that there is at least one assessment available on the specific area or target group. However, the data may not cover the situation for the entire geographic area or target group.					

Structural causes of conflict

All target groups

National

A UNDP/Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) report on the implications of the Syrian crisis from October 2013 highlights that since its outset in April 2011, the Syrian crisis impinged on an already deficient political situation in Lebanon. In fact, the country, especially since 2005, is subject to increasing political and security tensions. These were attributed to huge internal divisions among the different formations of the ruling political class, with respect to numerous issues including: the process of power sharing between the leadership of the different sectarian groups (mainly after the assassination of the former president Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005), the contested mode of implementation of the Taef Agreement (1989), the deficiency of the successive parliamentary election laws, the weak governance, and the predominance of a “clientelist” approach in dealing with major economic policy orientations and attempts to reform public administration and entities.

The UNDP/CRI report notes that these internal political divisions were exponentially aggravated, by the antagonistic direct implication of the different Lebanese politico-sectarian groups, and the stark regional and international confrontation that is still deeply taking over and dividing the Arab World into two major blocks: Syria, Iran, Iraq and the Lebanese “8 March” coalition (supported by Russia) on one hand, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey and the Lebanese “14 March” coalition on the other (supported by the EU and USA). Within such a dualistic regional and international framework, the gradual implicit or even explicit involvement of both Lebanese coalitions in the current Syrian conflict becomes rather a matter of fact.

An International Crisis Group (ICG) study in May 2013 highlights the delicate political and sectarian balance and a declining economy as sources of tension. In earlier reports, the organisation highlights the dominant political forces’ eroding ability to control their respective and increasingly polarised constituencies as structural causes of conflict, in addition to the lack of a strong central government.

A Carthage Center study in June 2013 identified the polarisation of supporters and opponents of the Government of Syria among the Lebanese political parties and communities as a structural cause for conflict. This polarisation is primarily based on the role of the Government of Syria during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and the Syrian occupation (1976-2005). In order to prevent the violence in Syria from spilling over into Lebanon, the GoL has officially decided on a “disassociation policy”, which means refraining from participating in the Syrian conflict in any way or taking positions for any side. However, tensions between supporters of the Syrian regime and supporters of the Syrian opposition groups have escalated into armed conflict in some regions, for instance Tripoli.

A Civil Peace Service (ZFD) study in December 2013 highlights that the structural causes of conflict go back to the governance system based on confessions and sects that has left significant groups unrepresented and feeling marginalised. The complex social fabric of Lebanon exists in delicate balance: underlying tensions between communities of differing religious and political loyalties are liable to erupt suddenly and with minimal provocation. In addition, the study identifies the presence of arms as a proximate cause of conflict in Lebanon.

The September World Bank Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict chapter on social cohesion outlines that prior to the Syrian crisis, national social cohesion in Lebanon could be generally characterised as weak, yet strong cohesion existed within communities and confessional groups. The historically weak sense of national identity in Lebanon combined with a strong sense of identity based on confessional affiliation, family, and community has served as an obstacle to realising national social cohesion. Lebanon’s political system and institutions, based on confessional affiliation, have constrained the

development of effective public institutions and the formation of a competent civil service. Given this weak pre-existing structure, the Syrian conflict has exasperated an already fragile social structure.

Lebanese and Syrian communities

National

The Syrian military presence in Lebanon left a lasting imprint on Lebanese-Syrian relations at all levels. However, in the civilian sphere, Lebanese-Syrian relations have not included serious conflict. Social tensions between Syrian migrant workers (predominantly in construction and agriculture) and the Lebanese, where they existed, were limited and containable, and were influenced by mutual traditions of hospitality and solidarity.

In its February 2014 conflict scan, Search for Common Ground underlines that tensions between Lebanese and Syrians go back more than three decades. The start of the Syrian presence in Lebanon in 1976 is a recent marking point. Syria proceeded to consolidate its grip on Lebanon's political system despite resistance by many political and popular elements of Lebanese society. A popular uproar following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri resulted in the end of Syria's military presence in Lebanon in 2005. However, the Syrian government still has significant influence over many political segments of Lebanon.

Over the years, many Syrian workers from rural villages have come to Lebanese coastal towns and cities to find work. This phenomenon has resulted in stereotypes of Syrians as either military officers or as menial workers with low social standing.

Proximate sources of tension

Lebanese and Syrian communities

National

Economy and livelihoods:

A Mercy Corps assessment of 1,200 households in areas of the North, Bekaa, Nabatiyeh and South found several sources of tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities. Economic pressure was found to be a significant driver of negative attitudes of host communities towards the refugee population. Within the assessment it was found that the more economically insecure Lebanese households felt, the more they resented the presence of refugees. In addition, competition for jobs was found as a source of significant tension between the communities, with Lebanese workers feeling priced out of the job market by Syrians willing to work for reduced wages. Syrians reported exploitation by employers who profit from their desperate circumstances. There is no significant difference in Syrian or Lebanese justification of violence across income groups. In addition, the assessment noted that where there is a high level of resentment, Lebanese are apt to blame the Syrians for a number of other grievances, including crime and vandalism.

The Mercy Corps assessment indicated that a further deterioration of the economic situation could exacerbate the current insecurity. The assessment showed that families which rely on a more diverse range of coping strategies are less likely to see violence as an acceptable way to meet their needs. In addition, the more optimistic Lebanese and Syrians are about their economic prospects, the more positive their impressions are of one another as a group. This suggests a low level of economic-related conflict between the groups, as long as they have robust coping strategies on which they can rely, as well as hope or reason to believe that their

economic situation will improve. In addition, the assessment data shows that greater perceptions of economic security decreases people's propensity toward violence, increases positive perceptions of the other group and increases overall feelings of safety.

Interestingly, the Mercy Corps assessment shows that while unfair wages had a significant negative effect on attitudes of the Lebanese towards the Syrians, this does not translate into a greater propensity towards violence: while perceptions of unfairness may make the Lebanese more resentful of the Syrian refugees, these same perceptions do not increase their proclivity to act violently.

Controlling for perceptions, Search for Common Ground also points out that Lebanese tend to exaggerate the extent of economic hardships experienced. Almost none of the 40% of Lebanese respondents who claim that access to, and shortages in, housing is one of the main causes of divisions between Lebanese and Syrians actually report having personally experienced such an issue. By contrast, 31% of Syrians say they experienced high rental prices.

An NRC situation report in September/October 2013 showed that the inability to pay rent (due to exclusion from assistance) has increased the tension between Syrians and their landlords.

A July 2013 assessment by Mercy Corps showed that respondents from Nabatiyeh and South are significantly less likely to show propensity towards violence relative to respondents in Bekaa, whereas respondents in North are significantly more likely to exhibit propensity towards violence relative to respondents in Bekaa.

Political developments and governance:

Mercy Corps data showed that both Lebanese and Syrians are now more likely to see violence as a legitimate strategy to support a just political cause. At the same time, the data showed that the more positive one's perception of local government performance, the less likely was one's propensity towards violence. This strong correlation suggests that if local governance capacity is strengthened, Lebanese constituents are less likely to turn to violent advocacy strategies.

The Mercy Corps assessment showed as well that Syrians that actively followed events in Syria are more likely to justify the use of violence than those that do not. The recent upturn in the number of cross-border military engagements and rocket attacks between Lebanese and Syrian factions could explain the shift in attitudes towards violence. The assessment indicates that it is highly conceivable that in the face of direct attacks, Lebanese and Syrians would adopt a more militant mindset.

Search for Common Ground findings indicate that political allegiances also have potential to result in bloody conflict and act as a trigger once tensions have escalated. Neither political allegiances nor the sectarian identity of either Syrians or Lebanese are predominate sources of division or subsequent conflict. Nonetheless, both remain greatly divisive factors when conflict occurs. A total of 17% of Lebanese and 9% of Syrians cited the political allegiances of the other as a major source of division. During qualitative focus group sessions, several Lebanese and Syrians described political and sectarian factors as the main issue that exacerbates conflict once it occurs.

The Search for Common Ground report also shows that the perception of safety goes hand in hand with perceptions of municipal capacity. Strong municipalities are able to relieve Lebanese host communities of feelings of anxiety in dealing with the refugee crisis. Residents who reported that municipalities were playing a positive role in their community also reported using more collaborative conflict resolution methods and mediation.

During an ALEF study in September 2013, it was observed that there was a tendency for personal conflicts between Syrians and Lebanese (including conflicts between landlords and tenants, and employee-employer) to escalate into more widespread confrontations. The study reports that this trend is notable particularly in areas with a strong presence of political parties, where conflicts can escalate into supporters versus opponents of the Syrian regime.

Negative perceptions and lack of social interaction:

The Mercy Corps assessment highlights that the relationship between Lebanese and Syrians is much more complex than just tensions over economic competition. While tensions already existed before the crisis, close trade, religious and family connections between Lebanon and Syria have at the same time created close relationships.

The Mercy Corps assessment shows that Lebanese hold ambivalent impressions of Syrian refugees, with little difference across income group. However, Lebanese are much more likely to have a negative perception of Syrian refugees if they expect their own wellbeing to get worse both in the short- and long-term.

A nationwide Fafo poll among 900 individuals in May 2013 showed that there is little trust among Lebanese communities towards Syrians. More than half of the surveyed population believed that no more Syrians should be allowed to enter Lebanon. In addition, most of those polled indicated that to a great extent, Syrians are taking jobs from Lebanese and causing Lebanese wages to fall. In addition, the majority of those participating in the poll indicated that Syrian refugees pose a threat to national security and stability.

On the other hand, the Mercy Corps assessment shows that Syrians generally have a positive impression of the Lebanese, but are more likely to feel less so for lower-/no-income groups.

The Mercy Corps focus group discussion showed that most of Lebanese and Syrians' negative perceptions of one another were based on what they were hearing in the media and from other people, and not rooted in personal experience.

The Mercy Corps assessment also shows that a higher level of social interaction between the two groups is also associated with a decrease in the likelihood of propensity towards violence. However, Syrians, particularly youth, mentioned in focus group discussions the difficulties they had interacting with Lebanese youth due to a difference in mentalities. Syrian men revealed their perception that Lebanese looked upon them with superiority.

An Amel gender analysis of host communities from August 2013 emphasised that the crisis reinforces conflicts about cultural differences and incompatibilities between the two communities. Lebanese women particularly fear a downgrade in their rights and freedoms under the influence of a much more conservative Syrian community.

Search for Common Ground confirms that inter-group perceptions between Syrians and Lebanese are mixed. Data shows that, although both communities would like to live in separate confines, they still have positive experiences and encounters on a daily basis. Cultural barriers between the Syrians and Lebanese groups are not prominent and both share a set of common traits such as language, religion and cuisine. Thus, there is space to implement a set of conflict mitigation policies in order to diffuse inter-group tensions. This was in contradiction to past responses where relations were seen to be tense enough to call for separation in living spaces. There were no severe cultural barriers between the two groups, but both wanted separation.

The majority of Syrians interviewed in focus groups by Search for Common Ground had positive views of Lebanese but expressed astonishment at the level of hostility they face from them. The perception of Syrians as "dirty, unsophisticated and prone to having many children" is prevalent among Lebanese participants and influences Lebanese perceptions.

Attitudes towards the use of violence also differ between Syrians and Lebanese. The Lebanese showed a higher propensity towards violence than Syrians, who were more conciliatory.

A ZFD study in December 2013 shows that with curfews, community policing and checkpoint security abounding, socialising has diminished and hence social cohesion within Lebanese communities is suffering. In many instances, both hosts and refugees do not interact and have no ongoing social relations.

Participants in focus group discussions led by Amel in August 2013 collectively agreed that the high level of insecurity and violence was one of the most acute consequences caused by the large presence of refugees, who are adopting negative coping mechanisms because of their difficult living conditions. The assessment indicates that word of mouth and media contribute to create fear and feelings of insecurity for Syrian men and boys.

Perceptions on access to services and aid:

In a September 2013 human rights study by ALEF, Lebanese communities indicated some frustration as social services were being provided solely to the Syrian communities.

A Wold Vision assessment in July 2013 indicated that there is a widespread perception amongst Lebanese communities assessed that Syrians are benefitting disproportionately from the national and international response. The assessment highlighted that there is a perception that Syrian refugees receive preferential access to Lebanese healthcare and education.

An assessment by Global Communities in October in Chouf, Baabda and Aley reported that nearly all of the respondents found it unfair that low-income Lebanese are not able to benefit from the same assistance as the Syrian refugees living in the same community.

A recently established Instrument for Stability (IfS) project has noted there is a perception and attitude among poor Lebanese communities that Syrian refugees receive preferential healthcare treatment, due to direct humanitarian assistance targeting. Media reports have added to local and sectarian friction over the access to finite public services. There are also reports that communities fear infectious disease outbreaks due to increasing numbers of refugees living in poor hygiene and sanitation conditions. This has contributed to increased prejudices and stigmatisation of refugees and built up frustration among the local community with local and central government.

North/T+5

Search for Common Ground confirms this finding in its February 2014 conflict scan carried out in South Lebanon and Tripoli, based on 900 household surveys, 40 focus group discussions and 41 key informant interviews. The scan highlights that economic factors, and particularly competition over employment opportunities, are seen as the main sources of division. Economic pressures facing the Lebanese host communities are expressed in resentment towards the international aid community as well as Syrian refugees. However, political and sectarian differences emerge as potential triggers for violent conflicts.

In a September 2013 human rights study, ALEF mapped tensions between refugee and host communities in Nabatieh, Jezzine, Shouf, Tyre, Saida, Metn and Wadi Khaled. During the assessment, Lebanese communities indicated some frustration with social services being provided solely to the Syrian communities and the increased competition for jobs. As a result of the frustration among the Lebanese, a number of violent confrontations with Syrian nationals, particularly involving Syrian migrant workers and males, have occurred. Lebanese residing in areas with a high concentration of Syrian refugees reported fear of kidnapping and crime, especially at night. As a result, many residents restrict movements after certain hours. In some areas frustration has resulted in the forced closure of commercial establishments owned or operated by Syrians.

The Search for Common Ground conflict scan in South Lebanon and Tripoli also highlights important differences.

- Residents of Tripoli have an especially dark history with regard to the Syrian government. When Syrian troops entered Tripoli in the 1980s, the city rose up against them and was eventually put down. At the time, the Syrian government empowered minority Alawites in the Jabal Mohsen district of the city to overpower the Sunni majority. Political issues were less pronounced, with economic sources of division

presenting the most potential for conflict. However, Tripoli residents have a much lower sense of safety due to the recurrent incidents and fighting in Tripoli.

- In the Southern districts of Kfarsir, Sarafand, Bourj Ech Chamali, and Ghaziyeh, Lebanese residents regarded political differences as a source of anxiety, adding to their existing frustration over the lack of employment opportunities and perceived housing issues. Security in the South was viewed as relatively stable.

In Tripoli, the Partners for Democratic Change International (PDCI)/Peace Labs assessment found the following sources of conflict:

- Religious and sectarian tensions, including sectarian tensions between the neighbourhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh, while dating back to Lebanon's civil war (1975-1990), have intensified due to the conflict in Syria.
- Refugees add to the existing poverty and place additional strain on the already weak services in the city and are affected themselves by the city's deteriorating security situation.
- A paralysed municipality along with a divided political leadership and a high presence of armed groups in the city has increased the divide between diverse groups.

Akkar

A 2010 conflict mapping assessment by World Vision showed that the following main drivers of conflict in the districts of Sahel, Middle Dreib and Higher Dreib in Akkar:

- Social class
- Socio-political ties with Syria and Syrian influence through political networks
- Unequal access to services between Christian and Muslim communities
- Contested land ownership over unclear borders
- Socio-political tensions between religious denominations

However, the World Vision July 2013 assessment, the PDCI/Peace Labs August 2013 assessment, and UNDP July 2012 local conflict assessments highlight how drivers of conflict differ on a local level within the district of Akkar:

- In Berkayl in Akkar, the PDCI/Peace Labs assessment identified the main drivers of conflict: the additional pressures on an already limited community infrastructure and resources such as water and electricity; environmental degradation and pollution of water sources caused by dumping of untreated waste water; disagreement over land delineation and conflict within local government institutions.
- The community of Fnaydek in Akkar prioritised three main sources of recurrent conflicts during a UNDP in-depth conflict assessment: disputes over irrigation water; the fight for control of political positions of authority in the village and the likelihood of young people to engage in political conflicts or criminality.
- For Wadi Khaled, a rapid assessment conducted by UNDP in October 2012 found out that the three key drivers of conflict specific to the area are the competition for jobs, the overburdening of the school system and, cultural distinction leading to isolation and concerns over illegal border trade.

Protection monitoring by the IRC in Akkar showed that confusion around criteria for targeted assistance and winterisation strategies have exacerbated tensions. In WadiKhaled these tensions are manifest in the establishment of ad-hoc checkpoints and protests.

Bekaa

A UNDP rapid assessment conducted in Aarsal listed integration problems of Syrian children into schools, clashes between March 8 and March 14 coalitions, and overstretching of infrastructures as the main sources of tensions. UNDP reached similar findings in Al-Qasr, where overcrowding of the education system and lack of assistance was putting youth at risk in December 2012.

South

Search for Common Ground confirms this finding in its February 2014 conflict scan carried out in South Lebanon and Tripoli, based on 900 household survey, 40 focus group discussion and 41 key informant interviews. The scan highlights that economic factors, and particularly competition over employment opportunities, are seen as the main sources of division. Economic pressures facing the Lebanese host communities are expressed in resentment towards the international aid community as well as Syrian refugees. However, political and sectarian differences emerge as potential triggers for violent conflicts.

Mount Lebanon

29% of respondents (of 208) from the host community in Chouf, Baabda and Aley felt that Syrian children should not be educated in Lebanese public schools, citing overcrowding as a main issue.

An October 2013 survey conducted by Global Communities in Chouf, Baabda and Aley with 208 respondents found that over 80% of Lebanese respondents reported a decrease in availability of work since 2012. As Syrians are often willing to work longer hours for lower wages, they are considered to be taking employment opportunities from the local Lebanese workforce. The same grievance was voiced in an assessment by Amel with over 70 key informants from the Bekaa, the South and Beirut, showing this to be a widespread concern.

Palestinian refugees from Syria and Palestinian host communities

Inside camps

Through its activities in the camp, UNRWA has observed that PRS are sometimes perceived as a threat to PRL holding low-paid daily-wage jobs in the informal sector. While there have been few reports of actual fighting between PRS and PRL, tensions between the hosting PRL community and the PRS who have arrived over the past two years are at times overt.

An assessment of 63 key informants in Beddawi camp by PDCI/PeaceLabs in August showed that the overcrowding is a source of conflict, as is the strain on resources, particularly water and electricity. The assessment concludes that it is likely that these issues exist in all the Palestinian camps, as over-crowding is a universal characteristic. Disputes also arise due to illegal encroachments on public property, unemployed youth, perceived nepotism and lack of transparency and accountability of the camp governing institutions, social and economic factors such as poverty, a deteriorating economic situation, a deteriorating political and security situation in the camp due to multiple factions and armed groups, failing social values, social ills etc.

However, during a Carthage Center assessment in June, observers report that the integration of new arrivals in the Palestinian camps has been very positive, with high levels of solidarity even regarding refugees who are not Palestinian.

There was no specific data available during the MSNA process on Lebanese returnees.

4.3 Possible Triggers for Further Escalation

Summary of assessment findings: Tensions are particularly high in specific areas that have been historically prone to violent incidents and localised conflict. Areas that have been identified as triggers to conflict or tension include increased competition over local resources, economic deprivation, attribution of crime to a specific group, mobilisation of communities causing sectarian tensions, and racist behaviour towards refugees. On a more regional scale, conflicts between different armed groups on Lebanese soil and the fall of the Government in Syria have been identified as possible triggers.

The following information covers all groups residing in Lebanon in all geographic areas

A study by ALEF in September highlights the following triggers for further escalation:

- Spill-over of the Syrian conflict (e.g. fighting in Tripoli; explosions in Southern suburb of Beirut)
- Retaliatory kidnappings
- Delays in formation of cabinet in Lebanon and controversial security sector appointments
- Social unrest as a result of economic deprivation
- Attribution of crime and disease to a specific group
- Opportunities to mobilise pre-existing grievances (e.g. sectarian tensions)

Other trigger events identified during workshops in 2012 were:

- Indiscriminate attacks by extremist Islamist groups
- The fall of the Government of Syria
- High level assassination in Lebanon
- Regional conflict
- Clashes between the Free Syrian Army and the Lebanese state/army

The December 2013 ZFD Conflict Analysis also mentions as potential triggers:

- The availability of small and middle-range weapons
- Racism with which the refugees are met

In its June 2013 study, the Carthage Center identified several violent prone areas:

- Tripoli (Jabal Mohsen, Bab al-Tabbaneh and Qibbe)
- Saida (Haret Saida, Taamir, Taamir Ain al- Hilweh, Abra)
- Beirut (Cola, Kaskas, Tariq al Jadideh), the northern Akkar region (especially Wadi Khaled)
- Bekaa (especially Aarsal, Hermel).

The study highlights the emergence of new violence-prone areas in North and Bekaa and Saida.

4.4 Current Conflict Trends

Summary of assessment findings: The overall security situation in Lebanon has deteriorated since the start of the crisis in Syria, with a number of targeted explosions and cross-border security incidents. There is little information on whether conflict incidents between and among communities in Lebanon have increased. Yet, more and more curfews are being imposed on Syrian refugees, who feel intimidated. The available information shows that a small portion of Syrians fear or have experienced harassment or violence in Lebanon.

The following table shows which target groups and geographic regions are covered by the assessments used in this section. It does not, however, show the quality of the assessments or the extent of the coverage.

Table [4]: Assessment coverage by geographic area and target population

	Vulnerable Local Communities (Lebanese and PRL)	Lebanese Returnees	PRS	Syrian refugees	
				Registered	Unregistered
National					
North/T+5					
Akkar					
Mt. Lebanon and Beirut					
Bekaa					
South					
Palestinian Camps					
Outside Palestinian Camps					
Legend					
	Section not applicable			Data available	
*NB – Grey cells indicate that there is at least one assessment available on the specific area or target group. However, the data may not cover the situation for the entire geographic area or target group.					

Lebanese and Syrian communities

National

Search for Common Ground's February 2014 conflict scan found that propensity to engage in violence exists and tensions are growing. The imposition of unofficial curfews on Syrian refugees in Lebanese host communities is becoming common practice. These curfews arouse feelings of seclusion among Syrian refugees, who feel intimidated by them. At the same time, results indicate that Syrians react passively to such practices because they see their situation as refugees to be a temporary one. However, as the political situation becomes more complicated it is expected that inter-communal tensions between Lebanese and Syrians will rise.

South

The perception of safety has deteriorated in Tripoli while security in the South is viewed as relatively stable. This perception is mirrored by responses from Syrians in Tripoli, of which 40% agreed that the level of safety had fallen from September to December 2013. The perception of safety in the South has remained relatively

unchanged over the coverage period. A total of 83% of survey respondents said that their perception of safety had not changed from September to December 2013. Qualitative focus groups demonstrate that both Syrians and Lebanese residents in the South experience higher perceptions of safety. This perception is associated with a positive outlook on the role of Lebanese political parties and municipalities.

Violent incidents: An estimated 10% of households assessed during the May/June VASyR reported having experienced some type of harassment while in Lebanon during the three months prior to the survey. 7% of households reported that insecurity limited the movement of at least some household members. Households that were registered for a longer time seemed to feel slightly more insecure and restricted their movements more than those awaiting registration. The main types of insecurity reported were lack of safety (56%), harassment (31%), extortion (27%), robberies (6%) and others (12%), such as threats and different types of discrimination. Insecurity was mainly caused by neighbours (42%), hosts or landlords (14%), shops (11%), local authorities (10%) and others (30%) within the local community.

UNDP analysis of IFS reports on security incidents involving Syrians shows that the number of incidents has been relatively stable between November 2012 and February 2013. A third of IFS reports relate to issues of illegal papers and documentation. Incidents with a higher impact on social cohesion such as thefts, frauds, and violent incidents are stable and not heavily concentrated in one particular location. However, the number of reported incidents targeting Syrians, particularly theft, has significantly risen recently, particularly in February. Considering that there are many limitations to such data, such as under-reporting or bias introduced by one particular IFS operation in one area, it is difficult to know whether this is due to higher reporting or a higher number of cases.

Mount Lebanon/Beirut

Violent incidents: Informal discussions and interviews with Lebanese community members and Syrian refugees in Chouf, Baabda and Aley by Global Communities in November among 273 individuals indicated that there has been an increase in fighting between the two groups, though from the assessment it is not clear what form this “fighting” takes.

6% of the assessed households during an assessment by Care in Mount Lebanon in August 2013 expressed concerns about moral, physical or sexual harassment or violence. During female focus group discussions, it was mentioned that problems of moral harassment/insults seemed to be more related to the fact that they are Syrians than to the fact that they are women. However, for those female and male groups that admitted to not feeling safe, their concerns were mainly for their children, as the most vulnerable group, to host community erratic violence.

There is no data available on the North/T+5, Akkar, Bekaa.

There is no data available for Palestinian refugees and Lebanese returnees.

4.5 Resources to Mitigate/Manage Conflict and Potential Change Agents

Summary of assessment findings: Although tensions are high, available information suggests that the majority of Lebanese and Syrians are conflict averse and therefore there is room for conflict mitigation efforts. Most information available highlights a trend of “self-protection” and that local actors such as religious leaders provide conflict resolution. There are important disparities throughout the country, with a more resilient political framework in the South that allows mediation by local institutions and political parties, while mediation in Tripoli should be carried out more by NGOs or international institutions. One assessment found that “natural leaders” of the Syrian community have not emerged and support networks are relatively weak. The only information on conflict mechanisms in Palestinian camps is a study on conflict mechanisms in Beddawi camp.

The following table shows which target groups and geographic regions are covered by the assessments used in this section. It does not, however, show the quality of the assessments or the extent of the coverage.

Table [5]: Assessment coverage by geographic area and target population

	Vulnerable Local Communities (Lebanese and PRL)	Lebanese Returnees	PRS	Syrian refugees	
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Outside Palestinian Camps					
Legend					
	Section not applicable			Data available	
*NB – Grey cells indicate that there is at least one assessment available on the specific area or target group. However, the data may not cover the situation for the entire geographic area or target group.					

Lebanese and Syrian communities

National

Search for Common Ground's February 2014 conflict scan found that Lebanese and Syrians are generally conflict averse. The majority preferred to avoid conflicts and said that mediation was the most employed tool of conflict resolution between the two groups. This, however, does not mean that propensity to violence is low. Contrary to that, focus groups have shown a strong level of tension between the two groups. Yet, the fact that Lebanese and Syrians prefer avoidance and mediation rather than confrontational methods shows that possibilities of conflict mitigation are strong.

A Mercy Corps assessment in August found that both Lebanese and Syrians tend to look to respected local actors to help resolve the dispute. For the Syrians, sheikhs or religious leaders were most often cited as people who could be trusted to mediate on their behalf. Lebanese look more toward political parties for help or trusted

individuals in the “village”. Neither group turns to the government, but the Syrians expressed a high level of trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The Mercy Corps assessment found that natural leaders of the Syrian communities have not emerged and support networks are relatively weak. This lack of cohesion ultimately undermines the ability of the refugees to capitalise on a potential collective safety net that can provide greater economic security and emotional and psychological support.

Search for Common Ground also identifies important specificities regarding mediation opportunities between Tripoli and the South:

- Political parties are seen to be more effective in addressing conflicts in the South than in Tripoli. The main reason for this difference is that the political framework in the South is more resilient than in Tripoli. Political forces and their associated local institutions in the South can enforce measures that prevent conflicts from escalating far better than in Tripoli.
- Perceptions of local institutions also differ in the South and Tripoli. Survey results indicate that Syrians and Lebanese in the South look more favourably upon the role that municipalities play in handling conflicts: in the South, 46% of respondents stated that municipalities played a positive role in conflict resolution compared to 0% in Tripoli.
- In the absence of strong local authorities and political parties, respondents in Tripoli seem to rely more on NGO and UN agency intervention.
- Mediation is perceived to be more prevalent in the South than in Tripoli, with respectively 63% and 32% of respondents identifying this method as the most prevalent method of conflict resolution. The divergence between the South and Tripoli is consistent with other findings. Those who perceived a negligible role for the municipality had a low perception of security and were less prone to use mediation and collaborative methods in conflict resolution. Qualitative findings show that mediation is utilised more in the South due to the relative size of community. The majority of mapped localities in the South were relatively small neighbourhoods and towns. The ability for a third party, such as a community or municipal leader, to interfere in conflict resolution was higher. In Tripoli, neighbourhoods with high population density do not permit the level of one-on-one relations that exist in the smaller communities in the South. What is more, due to the perceived weak municipal role in Tripoli, the majority of respondents did not have any institutional framework to refer to.
- PDCI/Peace Labs indicate in their assessment the divisions that exist within the community. Various families, and political and local government power structures, can both be a source for conflict escalation but also present potential for conflict interventions and as possible mediators.
- **Peace agents:** A ZFD study highlights that civil society (including NGOs, labour unions, individuals and various interest groups) can potentially bring about peaceful solutions. Over the past two decades, most civil society associations have been very active in playing a strong post-war role. However, the report states that local peace-building activities remain truncated and short of a national vision.

Bekaa and Akkar

A small scale assessment in December by Safa showed that traditional communities in the Bekaa and Wadi Khaled have tribal characteristics which entail forms of mediation-arbitration that could be useful for interventions to solve conflict and prevent violence. Some instances of successful interventions by clan leaders were noted in the North.

In Fnaydek in Akkar the UNDP conflict assessment found that historically, an informal village council (Majlessqaryeh) with representatives of the ten main Fnaydek families acted as the community conflict mediation mechanism. In addition, the following personalities and key positions were identified by the locality stakeholders consulted in the process of this assessment as “influential individuals” who can and might

possibly intervene in resolving community conflicts: locality parliamentary representatives; municipal leaders (when they are not part of the conflict); mukhtars; prominent family leaders; religious sheikhs; influential individuals (due to wealth or high position in government agencies), and; highly educated or well-known personalities. In short, any person held in high esteem and well respected in the community.

In Berkayel in Akkar, the PCDI/Peace Labs study found an absence of formally-established conflict mediation mechanisms. When a conflict arises, it is traditional that a third party, including the municipality president, mukhtar, or other influential person, would intervene to prevent the conflict from escalating further or to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflicting issue. This system is traditional in rural areas of Lebanon.

An ALEF study in September found that there is a trend of “self-protection” in Tripoli and Wadi Khaled, where Syrians do not trust or rely on official security forces. In Tripoli, Bekaa and Rashaya, refugees rely on influential community members, local political parties, armed factions and religious figures/groups for protection.

There was no specific data available on Lebanese returnees

Palestinian refugees

Palestinian camps

A PDCI/Peace Labs study in August 2013 in Beddawi camp found that the “official” established mechanism for conflict mediation and resolution is the Popular Committee. If mediation efforts of the Popular Committee fail, the Committee’s decisions would be enforced by the Security Committee. The Popular Committee is perceived by some to be corrupt and to exercise favouritism and nepotism. Other than the official representatives of the Popular Committee, influential leaders usually intervene in cases of conflict to assist the parties to reach an acceptable settlement of the dispute before the conflict degenerates into violence.

SECTION 5

5. PERSONS WITH SPECIFIC NEEDS (PwSN)

General:

While there appears to be no consensus on vulnerable groups within the assessment information available, a number of groups were highlighted during the SWG discussions including - minorities in the geographical area where they reside, and youth, who may form a significant destabilising factor within community. New arrivals were highlighted as a vulnerable group, as they have not yet established support networks. There is no further information available on the specific situation for PwSN.

6. INFORMATION GAPS

6.1 Target Groups

Almost no information is available on social cohesion within Palestinian communities in Lebanon and the impact of the arrival of Palestinian refugees from Syria on existing tensions or mitigation resources. It is also worth mentioning that none of the reports make a distinction between registered and unregistered refugees.

6.2 Geographical Focus

Most assessments available highlight the situation in the north of country, including Akkar. There is less information available on social cohesion in the South and Bekaa, and very limited information on social cohesion in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. There is a need to cover other geographical areas where tensions are high due to low level of acceptance of Syrian refugees. Such areas might be Koura, Zgharta, Batroun, and Metn. Within these geographic areas, more detailed information is necessary on the situation by type of shelter.

6.3 Themes

- **Impact of the crisis on stability:** there is no information available on the existing capacities of the most impacted municipalities and what the main bottlenecks are per geographical area.
- **Structural and proximate causes of conflict:** there is no information on how the perceptions of Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians on security and social cohesion have developed over time. In addition, there is an information gap on how the Syrian crisis has impacted more structural causes of conflict, particularly inter-Lebanese tensions.
- **Current conflict trends:** while the main security incidents are widely covered by media sources, there is almost no information available on whether and how localised tensions between and among communities result in conflict incidents. In addition, there is an information gap on the impact of the crisis on structural causes of conflict.
- **Actors:** there is a need to look in more detail at the different types of actors (individuals, groups and institutions) contributing to conflict/tensions, and to analyse their main interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships.
- **Resources to mitigate and manage conflict and potential change agents:** the available resources on potential change agents and conflict mitigation mechanisms are mostly anecdotal and patchy.
- **Impact of the response:** there is limited information on how the response is addressing the structural and immediate sources of tensions and on how it is fuelling existing tensions or creating new ones.

6.4 Persons With Specific Needs

There is very limited information available on how social cohesion is experienced by PwSN.

6.5 Planned Assessments

Planned Assessment	Date planned for
Social cohesion and impact of CSPs, Save the Children.	
Assessment of vulnerable host communities, nationwide, REACH/OCHA	Findings are expected towards the end of 2014.
Village profiling Akkar, REACH	Findings expected by the end of April
Conflict monitoring, UNDP	
Conflict scan Bekaa, Search for Common Ground	

SECTION 7

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION

Based on the data available and discussions with sector working group members, the MSNA team recommends the following:

- Establish an early warning system by identifying clear indicators for possible escalation of violence, taking into account the specific triggers for different geographic areas. Raise awareness on these indicators and set up a harmonised monitoring system, for instance integrated into the ongoing protection monitoring system as facilitated by UNHCR and the planned UNDP conflict monitoring system.
- While monitoring of the situation in traditional “hot spot” areas (including Wadi Khaled, Aarsal and Palestinian refugee camps) is the current priority, over time any monitoring system should attempt to capture other areas, including the South and Mount Lebanon.
- Capture, quantify and disseminate information on assistance provided to host communities as well as the positive impact of ongoing interventions on Lebanon. This is particularly important with regards to the upcoming large-scale cash-based programmes, which could increase tensions among and within communities.

ANNEX A

ASSESSMENTS/REPORTS CONSULTED AND REVIEWED

Organisation	Name of Report	Data Date	Collection	Area	Methodology
ALEF	Two years on: Syrian refugees in Lebanon	Aug-13		North, South, Bekaa, Beirut	Semi-structured interviews with KI, field visits, FGD, media monitoring and literature review.
AMEL	Gender Analysis of Host Communities affected by Syrian Refugee	Aug-13		South, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, Beirut	9 FGDs with Lebanese host communities in areas with high concentrations of Syrian refugees.
Carthage Centre	Understanding the Heightening Syrian Refugee Crisis and Lebanon's Political Polarization	Oct-13			11 semi-structured interviews with representatives of IOs, NGOs and FBOs, observations and informal talks during missions to North/Tripoli, the Bekaa region and Beirut including Palestinian camps, theoretical research including research institutions and media coverage.
FAFO	Ambivalent Hospitality Coping Strategies and Local Responses to Syrian refugees in Lebanon	May-13		Countrywide	900 individuals, random sampling. 40 in-depth interviews and 17 KI in Bebnine and 29 KI in Beirut, Tripoli and Akkar.
Government of Lebanon	Lebanon Road Map of Priority Interventions for Stabilization of the Syrian Conflict	Oct-13			
ICG	Too close for comfort	May-13			Desk review and small geographic case studies.
PCDI/Peace Labs	Community Conflicts in Northern Lebanon	Jul-13		Tripoli, Akkar	63 KI.
Mercy Corps	Things fall apart	Apr-13		North, Bekaa, Nabatiyeh and South	1,200 Syrian and Lebanese household, survey and 33 focus group discussions.

Search for Common Ground	Dialogue and Local Response Mechanisms to Conflict	Feb-14	Tripoli and South Lebanon	900 household survey (50% Syrians, 50% Lebanese), 40 focus group discussion, 41 interviews with key informant.
UNHCR- IRC	Protection Monitoring reports	November, December 2013 and January-February 2014	Mount Lebanon and Akkar	Qualitative through Focus Group Discussions, Key informants.
UNDP and CRI	The Syrian Crisis: Implications for Development Indicators and Development Planning	Oct-13		Literature review and seven regional working groups involving a total of 121 key informants.
UNDP	Fnaydek Conflict Assessment	Jul-12	Fnaydek (Akkar)	Participatory conflict assessment with a working group of 15 members.
World Bank	Socio-Economic impact of the Syrian crisis	Sep-13		Desk review, KI.
World Vision	Under Pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon	Jul-13	Akkar, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon/Beirut	FGD with 70 people. 50 KI. Discussions with 20 individuals on Syrian refugee site visits, and another 40 people (refugees and host communities) were interviewed for a series of case studies.
ZFD	Conflict Analysis Lebanon	Dec-13		Desk review, one FGD, KI.